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ABSTRACT
A ubiquitous form of government intervention in insurance markets is to provide compulsory,
but partial, public insurance coverage and to allow voluntary purchases of supplementary insurance on
the private market. Yet we know little about the effects of such programs on total insurance coverage and
on welfare.  A primary concern is that the compulsory public insurance program – designed to counter
the effects of adverse selection in the private insurance market – may in fact exacerbate adverse selection
pressures in the residual private insurance market. Theoretically, however, these programs may either
improve or impair the functioning of the residual private insurance market. To examine this question
empirically, I investigate the effect of the U.S. Medicare program – which provides partial public health
insurance to individuals aged 65 and over – on the private insurance market for prescription drugs, a
benefit not provided by the public program.  The results suggest that Medicare does not have substantial
spillover effects on residual private insurance markets. In particular, there is no evidence that Medicare







The standard economic rationale for government intervention in insurance markets is the presence of 
adverse selection in these markets.  Compulsory insurance coverage offers one way to overcome this 
problem. Indeed, in his seminal article on adverse selection, Akerlof (1970) points to the potential for the 
U.S. Medicare program – which provides compulsory public health insurance to all individuals over age 
65 – to overcome adverse selection problems in private health insurance markets for the elderly and thus 
to improve welfare. 
 In practice, the vast majority of compulsory public insurance programs, including the U.S. Medicare 
program, provide only partial insurance coverage. For example, Medicare pays for only half of all 
medical expenditures for the elderly, and leaves them exposed to substantial medical expenditure risk. 
The same is true of public health insurance programs in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Nor 
is the phenomenon limited to public health insurance programs. Around the world, defined benefit Social 
Security systems provide only partial annuitization for the elderly. Public disability insurance in both the 
U.S. and Canada also provides only limited insurance against lost wages and increased medical costs. In 
all of these instances, individuals have the option of buying supplemental insurance in the private market 
to “top up” their public insurance coverage.   
Yet, to my knowledge, we have no empirical evidence of the consequences of such partial programs 
for the workings of the private insurance market and hence for total insurance coverage.
 1 A primary 
concern is that these programs – designed to counteract the effects of adverse selection in private 
insurance markets – may in fact exacerbate adverse selection pressures in the residual private market. The 
public program could thus produce declines in total insurance coverage for some groups of privately-
insured individuals. This deleterious effect on the residual private market could partially or completely 
counteract any welfare gains from the increased insurance coverage provided through the public program 
to individuals whose private coverage would have been less than the publicly-provided amount. On the 
                                                 
1 Some attention has been paid to the case in which individuals must choose between partial public provision and 
private purchase. See for example Peltzman (1973) for public education or Cutler and Gruber (1996) for publicly 
provided health insurance for the poor.   2
other hand, if partial public insurance programs reduce adverse selection pressures in residual private 
insurance markets, the welfare gains from such programs would exceed those stemming directly from the 
public insurance coverage provided by the program. Theoretically, either effect may obtain.  
Partial public insurance may also affect the residual private insurance market through 
mechanisms other than its effect on selection pressures. On the one hand, the public program may tend to 
produce declines in private coverage for risks not covered by the public program if individuals mistakenly 
believe that the partial public program provides comprehensive coverage, or if there are large fixed costs 
to producing private insurance policies.  On the other hand, if much of the moral hazard induced by the 
private insurance is for services now-covered by the public program, the public program might stimulate 
increased private insurance coverage by reducing the costs and hence the marginal price of the private 
insurance.  
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the impact of such public insurance programs, this paper addresses 
the question empirically by examining the effect of the public Medicare program on the private market for 
prescription drug insurance, a benefit not provided by the public program. Empirical evidence of the 
effect of partial public insurance programs on residual private insurance markets has important 
implications not only for the welfare consequences of existing programs, such as Medicare and Social 
Security, but also for optimal policy design of future public insurance programs. For example, proposals 
for a Medicare prescription drug benefit almost always involve a less-than-comprehensive benefit and 
optional supplemental coverage; the desirability of such a program depends in part on how the private 
market for supplementary drug coverage is likely to function relative to the market for any drug coverage. 
I begin in Section two by considering theoretically the various possible mechanisms by which partial 
public insurance may affect – in either direction – coverage in the residual private market and social 
welfare. I also discuss ways to distinguish empirically among these mechanisms. Section three presents 
background information on the Medicare program and on the private insurance market for supplementary 
coverage.    3
Section four discusses the empirical approach. I follow a panel of retirees from the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS) over a two-year period to examine the effect of the discrete change in Medicare 
coverage that occurs when they turn 65 on whether they have private insurance coverage for prescription 
drugs.  To control for any confounding effects that aging or the passage of time may have on the demand 
and supply of private insurance for prescription drugs, I compare changes in prescription drug coverage 
for retirees who become covered by Medicare between interviews to changes in prescription drug 
coverage for two control groups of retirees who do not become covered by Medicare between interviews. 
One control group consists of retirees originally aged 60-62, who are not covered by Medicare in either 
interview; the other control group consists of retirees aged 65-67, who are covered by Medicare in both 
interviews.  
Section five presents the results. I find that Medicare coverage is not associated with changes in 
private insurance coverage for prescription drugs. However, because a partial public insurance program 
may affect the private insurance market through several different – and potentially offsetting – 
mechanisms, these aggregate results may mask specific effects of the Medicare program. To investigate 
more directly whether Medicare is associated with changes in adverse selection pressures in the private 
market, I examine the effect of Medicare separately for individuals of different health status. I find no 
evidence that Medicare is associated with increased adverse selection pressure in the supplementary 
private insurance market, and only weak evidence that it may in fact alleviate adverse selection problems 
in the residual private market. Additional, more indirect, tests also fail to find compelling evidence for a 
large role of consumer misinformation, fixed costs of insurance policies, or the moral hazard subsidy of 
the private insurance by the public program in understanding how the Medicare program affects the 
residual private insurance market.  
The results of this paper therefore suggest that Medicare does not have substantial spillover effects – 
either positive or negative – on the residual private insurance market. The final section considers the 
applicability of these findings to the likely effects of other partial public insurance programs. 
2. Partial Public Insurance Programs and Residual Private Insurance Markets    4
  The partial public insurance programs that I consider are universal and compulsory. They provide 
essentially first-dollar coverage (with perhaps some small deductible), but provide less than full insurance 
against the risk that they cover.
 2 They also allow the purchase of voluntary private insurance policies to 
supplement the compulsory public insurance. This supplementary insurance may either increase the 
amount of payment in event of a claim and/or provide payment for a service not covered by the public 
insurance program.  
In a model with perfect competition, constant returns to scale, perfect capital markets and 
symmetric, full information, the introduction of such a program should effect insurance coverage only by 
mechanically increasing insurance coverage for individuals whose private insurance coverage would 
otherwise have been less than the publicly-provided amount; the program should have no effect on total 
insurance coverage for those who would otherwise have private insurance coverage that exceeds the 
amount provided by the public program. Once we depart from this benchmark neo-classical model, 
however, it is possible to generate predictions – in either direction – for the effect that partial public 
insurance programs will have on total insurance coverage.  This section explores a number of such 
departures. I discuss their empirical predictions for the effect of partial public insurance programs on total 
insurance coverage, as well as their implications for the welfare consequences of introducing such a 
program.  
2.1 The Impact of Public Intervention on Adverse Selection in Private Insurance Markets 
Since the economic rationale for compulsory public insurance stems from its potential to 
overcome private market problems of adverse selection, the effect of partial public insurance on adverse 
selection in the private residual insurance market is of primary interest. Theoretically, however, the 
direction of this effect is ambiguous. Broadly speaking, it depends on whether insurance companies are 
                                                 
2 An alternative form of a partial public insurance program is one that covers catastrophic expenditures above a high 
deductible and allows private markets to supply “low end” policies. A rich theoretical debate on the efficiency of 
such plans – with particular attention to moral hazard effects – can be found in Besley (1989), Selden (1993), 
Blomqvist and Johannson (1997), and Selden (1997).    5
restricted to linear pricing schedules or whether they can offer exclusive contracts and therefore a convex 
pricing schedule.
3 
Abel (1986) develops a formal model of the effects of introducing a partial public insurance 
program in a private insurance market with non-exclusive contracts (i.e. linear pricing).  The model – 
developed in the context of defined benefit social security programs and residual private annuity markets 
– suggests that the partial insurance provided by the public program exacerbates adverse selection 
pressures in the residual private market.  An implication is that defined benefit social security programs, 
which provide only partial annuitization, may be partly responsible for the limited size of private annuity 
markets.
4 
To illustrate the intuition for this result, I develop the implications of a partial public insurance 
program in a more simple – but also more general – linear pricing model than that of Abel (1986).
5 
Individuals, who vary only in terms of their (privately known) risk type  ) (p of incurring loss ) (L , face a 
choice of whether to buy an exogenously-given quantity of insurance  ) (s . Figure 1 shows the cost and 
value functions graphically. The zero profit condition determines that the equilibrium insurance price is 
the weighted-average expected payment across buyer types, which is denoted by ) , ( p s C . Let  ) , , ( L p s V  
denote the value of the insurance to an individual who with probability p will incur a financial loss of 
L; the single crossing property implies that the value of the insurance package at the common pooling 
price is increasing in risk type. The intersection of the two curves at  * p  determines the equilibrium; all 
individuals of risk type  * p or higher purchase insurance at price  * C . 
  Ignoring its income effects, we can model the introduction of partial public insurance coverage as 
reducing the amount of exposed risk from  L to  m L- , where m is the amount of publicly-provided 
                                                 
3 Chiappori (2000) notes that this distinction is a critical distinction more generally among asymmetric information 
models of insurance markets. 
4 Indeed, Walliser’s (2000) simulations based on the Abel model suggest that eliminating Social Security could 
reduce adverse selection in annuity markets by as much as 35 percent. 
5 This is a modified version of the graphical analysis presented in Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) in which individuals 
choose among two types of plans.   6
coverage.
6 For simplicity, assume  L m s £ + . Therefore the cost curve is not affected by the introduction 
of the public program. However, public provision of m  reduces both the value of private insurance and 
the difference in valuation between individuals of different risk types. As the amount of exposed risk 
) ( m L -  decreases, the risk premium decreases and thus the value of private insurance coverage falls. 
When individuals face a common price for insurance, the single crossing property implies that the value 
of insurance declines more for higher risk individuals. Figure 1 captures these two effects of introducing 
the public insurance program: the new value function, denoted by  ) , , ( m L p s V - , has a smaller intercept 
and a flatter slope. As a result, the lowest risk individual previously purchasing insurance (i.e. type  * p ) 
no longer values it at cost, and so drops out of the market. At the new equilibrium the lowest risk type 
purchasing insurance has increased from  * p  to 
m p and the equilibrium price from  * C  to 
m C . These 
effects reduce the gains in insurance coverage and in welfare from the public insurance program.  
Intuitively, the introduction (or expansion) of a partial public insurance program reduces individual 
exposure to risk and thus reduces the consumer surplus from purchasing private insurance at a given 
price. Since – when facing a common price for insurance – this consumer surplus is lowest for lowest risk 
individuals (and zero by definition for the lowest-risk individual who chooses to purchase the insurance), 
the public program induces some low risk individuals to drop out of the private market, driving up the 
equilibrium price of insurance and thus prompting further declines in private coverage. In principle, the 
result could be a complete destruction of the private market. The linear pricing model thus offers the 
empirical prediction that the introduction of the partial public insurance program should be associated 
with declines in total insurance coverage for individuals whose private coverage would otherwise have 
exceeded the amount provided by the public program. These declines should be particularly pronounced 
among the lowest risk individuals in this group. 
                                                 
6 Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), there are no income effects on insurance demand 
from the introduction of the public program. In the empirical work, I directly test the income effects from the 
introduction of Medicare and find them to be small.   7
  When insurance companies are capable of enforcing exclusive contracts (i.e. offering a convex 
pricing schedule), partial public insurance programs can have the opposite effect on the private insurance 
market. Wilson (1977) provided the striking result that when there is a pooling equilibrium in a private 
insurance market with adverse selection, the government can always Pareto dominate such an equilibrium 
by providing partial insurance at the market odds price and allowing the private market to provide 
supplemental insurance coverage.
7 This result has been cited in support of the welfare-enhancing potential 
of a variety of partial public insurance programs that allow for private supplementation such as 
mandatory, non-discriminatory Social Security programs with voluntary private annuity markets (see for 
example Eckstein et al. 1985) and compulsory partial health insurance coverage with supplementary 
private markets (see for example Neudeck and Podczeck 1996). Finkelstein (2002) shows that this Pareto 
improving role for the public insurance program stems from the fact that, the introduction of the public 
insurance policy relaxes the constraint imposed by the Wilson models that individuals may hold only a 
single private insurance policy. Individuals may not hold two separate insurance policies: one public and 
one private. This allows individuals to hold both a pooling policy and a separating policy, thus enhancing 
efficiency relative to the no-intervention case in which individuals can hold either a separating or a 
pooling policy but not both. A key requirement therefore for the potential for the public policy to be 
Pareto-improving in this model is the assumption that individuals are restricted to holding only one 
private insurance policy. Finkelstein (2002) demonstrates that this assumption appears valid for private 
health insurance markets. Therefore in principle, partial public health insurance programs may produce 
Pareto improvements as suggested by the Wilson (1977) model. The model produces the empirical 
prediction that the partial public insurance program should produce increases in total insurance coverage 
among the highest risk; its effect on total insurance coverage for lower risk individuals who otherwise 
would have had private insurance coverage is ambiguous. 
2.2 Other effects of partial public insurance programs on private insurance markets  
                                                 
7 Eckstein et al (1985) discuss the full range in the amount of partial public coverage for which this result holds.   8
Apart from its impact on adverse selection, there are three other venues by which public 
insurance provision may affect private insurance markets. These too offer testable empirical predictions. 
First, if individuals mistakenly believe that the public program provides comprehensive coverage, then 
the introduction of a partial public insurance program may produce declines in total insurance coverage 
and in welfare for individuals who originally had more private insurance than the amount provided by the 
public program. This type of misinformation suggests that declines in private insurance coverage should 
be particularly pronounced among individuals who are least likely to be aware of the limitation of the 
public program.  
  Second, if there are fixed costs to insurance policies, than partial public insurance programs can 
be expected to result in declines in total insurance coverage for some individuals who originally had more 
private insurance than the amount provided by the public program. By decreasing the amount of exposed 
risk, the partial public insurance program decreases the willingness to pay the fixed cost for private 
coverage for the residual risk. This model predicts that declines in private insurance coverage should be 
particularly pronounced for those with less comprehensive insurance coverage prior to the partial public 
program and for lower risk individuals.
8  The welfare implications depend on the relative efficiency of 
public and private provision. If both sectors are equally efficient, the public program produces wasteful 
duplication of fixed costs. Of course, if the public sector is more efficient, the welfare losses from the 
duplication of fixed costs could be partially or completely offset.  
Third, much of the moral hazard induced by private insurance may be for services covered by the 
public insurance program. The introduction of the public program should therefore tend to reduce the 
private of private insurance and thus produce increases in private coverage for residual risks not covered 
by the public program. The welfare effects of increases in insurance coverage from the moral hazard 
externality are ambiguous. Pauly (1974) demonstrates that, when individuals are identical, the moral 
hazard subsidy of the private insurance reduces welfare gains associated with the public program unless 
                                                 
8 This latter prediction holds both in models of asymmetric information in which the low risk have less insurance 
than the high risk (see e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)) and in models with symmetric information.   9
those who buy supplementary coverage are assessed an additional premium for the public insurance to 
reflect the increased use of this insurance induced by the private coverage.  However, when 
heterogeneous agents and adverse selection are added to the model, there may be welfare gains from the 
moral hazard subsidy since in markets with adverse selection, insurance is priced too high to attract low 
risk individuals (Marquis 1992). The subsidy may increase the willingness of low risk individuals to pool 
with high risk individuals, and thus reduce the adverse selection pressures. 
3. The Empirical Setting: The U.S. Medicare Program 
Since the effects of partial public insurance programs are theoretically ambiguous, I examine 
them empirically by investigating the consequences of the partial public health insurance provided 
through the U.S. Medicare system. 
3.1 Partial Government-Provided Health Insurance for the Elderly: The U.S. Medicare Program 
  The U.S. Medicare program provides partial public health insurance coverage to the elderly and 
to the disabled. This paper focuses on the elderly whose eligibility begins at age 65; this discrete change 
in eligibility at age 65 provides a mechanism for distinguishing the effects of Medicare from other effects 
of aging. Almost all individuals aged 65 or older are covered by Medicare.
9 This high coverage rate is not 
surprising given that Medicare Part A  (which primarily covers non-physician inpatient hospital care 
expenses) is financed through payroll taxes on the employed while Medicare Part B (which primarily 
covers physician fees for covered services) is heavily subsidized (U.S. House of Representatives 1998). 
  Although essentially universal among the elderly, Medicare coverage is far from comprehensive. 
Indeed, Medicare pays for less than half of the health care costs of the elderly (Piacentini and Foley 
(1992). Gaps in Medicare coverage fit into three main categories. First, there are cost-sharing provisions –
annual deductibles and uncapped co-payments –  for the health services that Medicare covers. Second, 
there are certain health services that Medicare covers only partially and/or with severe restrictions, such 
as care in a skilled nursing facility or home health care. Third, there are health services that Medicare 
does not cover at all, which are primarily outpatient prescription drugs and long term care.   
                                                 
9 Author’s calculations from the 2000 HRS indicate 97% self-reported coverage.   10 
  Of critical importance for the analysis is the fact that Medicare provides substantially less 
coverage than most private insurance held prior to age 65 (Piacentini and Foley (1992)).
10 In particular, 
prior to age 65, most (85 percent) of private retiree health insurance policies cover prescription drugs, 
whereas Medicare does not. By contrast, Medicare is similar to most private health insurance policies in 
providing little long-term care coverage. 
3.2 Private coverage to supplement Medicare 
Not surprisingly, therefore, private coverage to supplement Medicare is widespread. About 85 percent 
of the non-disabled, non-indigent elderly have some private insurance to cover some of the services not 
covered by Medicare. This “Medigap” coverage is provided through an insurance policy from a current or 
former employer or union (56%), an insurance policy purchased directly from an insurance company 
(26%), or a Medicare HMO (16%) which, in exchange for limiting the individual to a network of 
providers and sometimes for a premium as well, will cover Medicare services and also an expanded 
benefit package.
11   
4. Empirical approach 
4.1 Data and Sample Definition 
The data are from the three waves of the HRS (1996, 1998 and 2000) that have information on 
prescription drug coverage.  The HRS is a national, panel data set that began in 1992 with a sample of 
primary interviewees aged 51-61 and their spouses.  
The basic empirical strategy is to compare private health insurance markets for retirees who are 
covered by Medicare with those for retirees who are not covered by Medicare. I follow a panel of retirees 
originally aged 60 to 67 over a two-year period. Retirees who are 63 or 64 in the first interview (the 
“treatment group”) become covered by Medicare between interviews. This discrete change in Medicare 
coverage at age 65 is used to identify its effects. I compare the changes in private health insurance for 
                                                 
10 Indeed, estimates suggest that in terms of comprehensiveness of coverage, Medicare ranks in the bottom quartile – 
and perhaps as low as the bottom decile – of employer plans in medium and large firms. (Conversation with James 
Mays of the Actuarial Research Corporation. Estimates based on the 1988 BLS Employee Benefits Survey of 
medium and large firms.) 
11 Author’s calculations from the 2000 HRS.   11 
retirees who become covered by Medicare between interviewers to changes for two control groups who 
are close in age to the treatment group but do not experience any change in Medicare coverage between 
interviews. The Younger Control Group consists of retirees aged 60-62 in the first interview who are 
therefore not on Medicare in either interview. The Older Control Group consists of retirees who are 65-67 
in the first interview who are therefore covered by Medicare in both interviews.  This comparison is 
designed to isolate the effect of Medicare from other effects of aging and the passage of time on private 
health insurance markets. 
I use the three waves of the HRS panel to form two, two-wave “stacked” panels. Some 
individuals therefore appear in two separate observations (in differences); indeed, the 2,999 observations 
(in differences) in the data represent 2,1774 unique retirees.
12 An alternative approach would be to use the 
data as one “long”, three-wave panel and to compare changes in retiree’s insurance upon turning 65 to 
their own changes at other ages. However, since the dependent variable are all binary, the retiree is not a 
good control for himself as he cannot experience the same change twice in a three-wave panel.
13  
I restrict my sample in three main ways. All restrictions are made based on status at the first 
interview.
14 First, the sample is limited to retirees, whom I define based on self-reporting of their 
employment situation.
15 This restriction avoids confounding the effect of Medicare with the effect of 
retirement. Medicare is the primary payer for retirees with retiree health insurance at age 65 and over and 
employers can – and do – offer difference health insurance packages to retirees based on Medicare 
eligibility. They can also charge age-based prices for any health insurance offered, as long as this is 
                                                 
12 In 1998, two new cohorts representing individuals born between 1924 and 1930 and individuals born between 
1942 and 1947 were added to the sample and the entire sample was merged with the AHEAD sample which consists 
of individuals born before 1924. As a result some of the older individuals are only surveyed in 1998 and 2000 and 
therefore do not have repeat observations (in differences).   
13 In results not reported here, I ascertained that the main results are not sensitive to this alternative specification.  
14 Throughout this paper I use the term “first interview” to refer to the first observation in time of the two 
observations on an individual. The observations may either come from the 1996 and 1998 surveys (in which case the 
“first interview” is the 1996 survey) or they may come from the 1998 and 2000 surveys (in which case the “first 
interview” is the 1998 survey). 
15 Individuals who report their employment situation as “homemaker” are not included in the sample. This helps to 
reduce the number of likely spousal dependents in the data. Such spousal dependents – since they become covered 
by Medicare at a different age than the primary earner – may dampen the relationship between Medicare and 
changes in private health insurance decisions that occur precisely at age 65. I discuss this issue more in the 
specification checks below.   12 
actuarially based.
 Employer contributions to retiree health insurance – like their contributions to employee 
health insurance – are not taxable income to the individual.
16 Second, I further limit the sample to 
individuals who do not report themselves as disabled since disabled individuals may be covered by 
Medicare regardless of age.   
Finally, the sample is limited to people who are not covered by military health insurance and are 
not eligible for Medicaid, the public health insurance program that covers certain classes of poor people. 
This last restriction must be made with some care as Medicaid eligibility expands at age 65.
17 In order not 
to confound any effects of Medicare coverage at age 65 with those of expanded Medicaid eligibility at 
age 65, I limit the sample to retirees who, based on their income and assets, would not meet the criteria 
for Medicaid eligibility at age 65, regardless of their current age.
18 
4.2 Dependent variables 
  All of the dependent variables used in this paper are binary measures of private health insurance 
coverage. The HRS provides information on whether the individual has any private health insurance for 
acute medical care, whether this private health insurance covers prescription drugs, and whether the 
individual has any private insurance to cover the costs of long-term care.
19 Information is available on 
whether the insurance for acute medical care is provided through a current or former employer or not. As 
is typical of most survey data, there is not however, any measure on the amount of coverage.  The data 
therefore only permit an analysis of the effects of Medicare on the extensive coverage margin. However, 
                                                 
16 The description of regulations for retiree health insurance before and after age 65 is based on a review of the 
relevant parts of ERISA, IRA non-discrimination rules, and the ADEA, as well as on conversations with program 
officials in the offices that oversee these regulations. 
17 In practice, this expansion is not large: Medicaid coverage rises from 6 percent of individuals aged 45 to 64 to 8.9 
percent of individuals aged 65 and older (U.S. House of Representatives, 1998). 
18 I choose the income and asset thresholds to exclude individuals who – if they were age 65 – would either by 
eligible for full Medicaid or for QMBY (which covers Medicare part B premiums and co-payments for part A and 
part B). I do not exclude individuals who would be eligible for SLMBY, since these individuals only receive a slight 
income transfer through the payment of the part B premium. In results not reported here, I find that the results are 
not sensitive to more restrictive income and resource floors to exclude people who would be eligible for SLMBY as 
well. 
19 Long term care insurance coverage in the HRS is measured by responses to the following question: “Not 
including government programs, do you now have any insurance which specifically covers any part of personal or 
medical care in your home or in a nursing home for a year or more?” (question R85) 
   13 
since the various possible mechanisms by which Medicare may affect prescription drug coverage should 
have a similar impact on both the extensive and the intensive margin, evidence on the extensive margin is 
informative in trying to understand whether and how partial public health insurance programs may affect 
the residual private insurance market. 
The primary dependent variable of interest is prescription drug coverage, since this represents the 
largest measurable gap in Medicare coverage that, prior to age 65, tends to be covered by the same 
insurance product that covers the services subsequently-covered by Medicare. In contrast, long-term care 
insurance is most often purchased as a stand-alone product, both before and after age 65. Therefore any 
effects of Medicare that operate through changing adverse selection pressures should affect the 
prescription drug insurance market but not the long-term care insurance market.  
Understanding the reasons for this bundling of prescription drugs with other health services in the 
pre-Medicare insurance market is important in thinking about the likely consequences of Medicare 
coverage both for insurance coverage and for welfare. Economies of scale and scope in the production of 
insurance policies may play a role. The complementary nature of the health services covered may be a 
factor; a private policy that covers hospital and doctor services but not prescription drugs may produce 
inefficiencies in the delivery of health care. Furthermore, insurance companies may not want to leave 
open the possibility of individuals buying additional supplemental coverage for prescription drugs as the 
moral hazard effects of this coverage on doctor and hospital services would not have been priced in their 
partial policy. Finally, bundling prescription drug coverage with other forms of coverage may be a way to 
reduce adverse selection pressures if the correlation between these risk types is less than 1. This may be 
particularly important in reducing adverse selection pressures for prescription drugs since the 
predictability of prescription drug expenditures makes it subject to particularly strong adverse selection 
pressures. 
There are several judgment calls to make in defining prescription drug coverage. Measures of 
prescription drug coverage can be created using self-reported information on drug coverage and/or self-
reported information on whether the individual had any prescription drug expenses that were covered by   14 
insurance. In addition, the question pattern in the HRS suggests that there will be systematic under-
reporting of drug coverage provided through a Medicare HMO. For reasons discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix A, I choose to use self-reported measures of drug coverage and to assign drug coverage to all 
individuals in a Medicare HMO. Appendix A also explores several alternative approaches to measuring 
prescription drug coverage and shows that the principal findings are not sensitive to the choices made.  
4.3 Empirical approach 
The basic specification for any one of the three groups of interest – the treatment group, the 
younger control group, or the older control group – is as follows: 
i i i X y e d b + D + = D 0                     (1) 
The key parameter of interest is the constant,  0 b , which reflects the average change in the dependent 
variable for the group, after controlling for the effects of changes in other covariates.  X D controls for 
changes in household income between interviews. 
When I combine the estimates from the treatment and the control groups into one difference-in-
differences estimate, I estimate: 
i i i i MEDICARE X y e g d b + D + D + = D 0               (2) 
i MEDICARE D  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the individual is in the treatment group, and 
thus experienced a change in Medicare status between interviews.   
When I estimate equation (1) for the treatment group,  0 b reflects the combined effects of 
becoming eligible for Medicare and any effects of aging or the passage of time. The identifying 
assumption in equation (2) is that any effects of aging or the passage of time are the same for retirees aged 
60-62 and aged 65-67 as they are for retirees aged 63 and 64. Under this assumption,  0 b  now measures 
the aging and time effects and g  measures the effect of a change in Medicare coverage.     15 
I estimate equations (1) and (2) by OLS. I adjust the standard errors for correlation within the 
error term across observations (in differences) for the same individual. I estimate all regressions using the 
HRS weights for the first interview. 
4.4  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics. The middle column shows sample averages for the treatment 
group. The other two columns show the sample average for the younger and older control groups. The 
racial, gender, educational and income composition of the three groups is very similar. The proportion in 
worse health tends to increase with age, which is not surprising. The only other noticeable difference 
between the groups – apart from than their age – is that the observations from the older control group are 
disproportionately from following retirees from the 1998 to 2000 survey. This simply reflects the fact that 
younger retirees “age into” the older control group by the second pair of surveys. In the analysis below I 
investigate the sensitivity of my findings to this compositional change by looking at whether the 
estimated effects vary across pairs of adjacent surveys.  
5. Results 
5.1 Prescription Drug Changes for the whole sample 
Table 2 presents evidence of the effect of Medicare on private prescription drug coverage. The 
first three columns show the estimated change in prescription drug coverage between interviews 
separately for each of the control groups and for the treatment group.  The final column shows the 
difference-in-difference estimate of the change in prescription drug coverage for those who turn 65 
between interviews relative to the change in prescription drug coverage for those in the control groups. In 
this specification, the coefficient of interest is that on  MEDICARE D . Under the identifying 
assumptions, it reflects the effect of becoming covered by Medicare on private prescription drug 
coverage.  
There is little evidence of an aggregate effect of Medicare coverage on prescription drug 
coverage.  Medicare coverage is associated with a statistically insignificant 2 to 3 percentage point (4 to 5 
percent) increase in prescription drug coverage.   We can reject – at the 95 percent confidence level – an   16 
effect of Medicare on prescription drug coverage that is larger than a 2 percentage point (3 percent) 
decline or a 7 percentage point (10 percent) increase in prescription drug coverage. This result holds both 
without the inclusion of covariates (the top panel) and with the inclusion of covariates (the second 
panel).
20  The result also holds both when the treatment group alone is analyzed and in the difference-in-
differences specification; this similarity alleviates concerns that the results hinge critically on the 
untestable identifying assumption. This similarity in estimates in the treatment group and the difference-
in-differences analysis prevails in all of the subsequent analyses. 
The aggregate results thus paint a picture of a lack of any net effect of Medicare on the private 
market for prescription drug insurance. However, it is possible that several of the mechanisms described 
in section two are at work in opposing directions. The next sections therefore develop more targeted tests 
of whether Medicare affects the private market through particular mechanisms.  
5.2 The effects on adverse selection: prescription drug coverage by health status 
  To look at the effect of Medicare on adverse selection in the private market for prescription drug 
coverage, I examine whether Medicare has a differential effect on private insurance coverage for 
prescription drugs for individuals of different health status. I use two different measures of health status, 
both based on self-reports at the time of the first interview.  Table 3 estimates the effect of Medicare by 
self-reported health status (poor or fair, good, very good or excellent). Table 4 estimates the effect of 
Medicare by the number of chronic conditions the retiree reports (zero, one, two, or three or more).
21 
  There is no evidence of an increase in adverse selection in the private insurance market associated 
with Medicare coverage. Table 3 indicates that, to the contrary, Medicare is associated with a 12 to 14 
percentage point increase in prescription drug coverage among those who report themselves to be highest 
risk (i.e. in fair or poor health) and no evidence of an effect of Medicare on prescription drug coverage for 
those who report themselves to be in better health. The estimated effect of Medicare on those in fair or 
                                                 
20 All subsequent results control for covariates but the results are never sensitive to this control. 
21 Individuals are asked about seven chronic conditions: high blood pressure or hypertension, diabetes or high blood 
sugar, cancer, chronic lung disease (such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema), heart problems (such as heart attack, 
coronary heart disease, angina or congestive heart failure), stroke, or arthritis or rheumatism.   17 
poor health is statistically significantly different at the five percent level in both the treatment group and 
the difference-in-differences specification from the estimated effect of Medicare on those in good health 
or those in very good or excellent health. This finding is broadly consistent with the predictions of the 
Wilson (1977) model in which partial public insurance programs can produce increases in insurance 
coverage for the highest risk and Pareto improvements over the original private market equilibrium.  
  However, when an alternative definition of health status based on the reported number of chronic 
conditions is used, Table 4 indicates that there is no evidence of a substantively or statistically significant 
differential effect of Medicare by health status. In particular, there is no evidence either of Medicare being 
associated with a disproportionate decrease in drug coverage among the most healthy (predicted by Abel 
(1986)) or a disproportionate increase in drug coverage among the least healthy (predicted by Wilson 
(1977)). The results in Tables 3 and 4 therefore present convincing evidence that Medicare does not 
exacerbate adverse selection in the private prescription drug market. There is only weak evidence that 
Medicare might alleviate these problems.  
5.3 Other effects of partial public insurance programs on private insurance markets 
While the main focus of the paper is on the effect of Medicare on adverse selection in the residual 
private insurance market, the data also present some indirect and somewhat weaker tests of other possible 
effects of Medicare on the residual private insurance market. First, I investigate a possible role for 
misinformation about the limited nature of the public coverage. I examine whether Medicare is associated 
with a larger decline in prescription drug coverage among individuals who are less likely to be aware of 
the lack of prescription drug coverage in the public program. Such individuals includes those with lower 
educational attainment and those who do not regularly use prescription medicine.  The evidence in Table 
5 does not support a role for misinformation: the association between Medicare coverage and prescription 
drug coverage is not substantively or statistically different for retirees of different educational attainment 
or between retirees who do and do not regularly use prescription medicine.  
Another way to look for an effect of consumer misinformation is through the effect of Medicare 
on the market for long-term care insurance, another benefit not provided through Medicare. Any effect of   18 
Medicare found here is less likely due to other factors such as changes in adverse selection pressures or 
fixed costs of insurance since, as discussed above, long-term care insurance is – both before and after age 
65 –  typically sold as a separate product from acute medical coverage. Table 6 presents estimates of the 
effect of Medicare on coverage for long-term care insurance both for the whole sample and by 
educational attainment. There is no evidence that long-term care insurance coverage declines when 
retirees become covered by Medicare, as might be expected if they mistakenly believe that Medicare now 
covers them for long-term care expenses. To the contrary, there is evidence of a statistically significant 4 
percentage point (35 percent) increase in long-term care insurance coverage associated with Medicare 
coverage. This may be due to the “focusing” event provided by Medicare coverage that causes individuals 
to rethink their health care needs as elderly individuals.  There is no evidence that Medicare is associated 
with relative declines in long-term care insurance coverage among the less educated.  
Second, I test for a role for fixed costs of insurance or a moral hazard subsidy in explaining how 
partial public insurance programs may affect private markets by examining the effect of Medicare on 
private insurance coverage that does not cover prescription drugs. The presence of substantial fixed costs 
to insurance contracts predicts the Medicare should be associated with particularly pronounced declines in 
less comprehensive insurance packages, such as those that do not cover prescription drugs. Furthermore, 
these declines should be more pronounced among the most healthy (lowest risk) who, even under 
symmetric information, would face a more binding participation constraint.  By contrast, a large moral 
hazard subsidy predicts that Medicare coverage should be associated with particularly pronounced 
increases in private insurance that does not cover prescription drugs; after age 65, such Medigap 
insurance covers essentially only the cost-sharing provisions (co-payments and deductibles) of Medicare, 
which are the benefits that receive the largest moral hazard subsidy.  
Table 7 therefore analyzes the effect of Medicare on private health insurance that does not cover 
prescription drugs. There is no evidence of any change – in either direction – in health insurance that does 
not cover prescription drugs associated with Medicare coverage. Nor is there evidence of relative declines   19 
in this insurance among the most healthy (lowest risk) as would be predicted by a fixed costs story.
22 This 
mitigates against a large role both of a moral hazard subsidy and fixed costs of insurance policies in 
affecting how Medicare coverage impacts the residual private market. However, since these two factors 
exert opposing pressure on prescription drug coverage, I cannot reject the hypothesis that both factors are 
exerting a large effect in opposite – and offsetting – directions.   
5.4 Specification checks 
I perform a battery of tests to investigate the robustness of the results reported above. These tests 
are applied to all of the analyses reported in Tables 2 through 7. A primary concern is that while Medicare 
coverage applies only to the individual, private insurance is often held jointly by a married couple. 
Retirees may be affected by Medicare at ages other than 65 if their spouse turns 65 and was the source of 
the private insurance coverage. Similarly, if a spouse retires between interviews, this may affect insurance 
coverage for the other member of the couple.
23 To address these concerns, Table 8 reports the estimated 
effect of Medicare from the difference-in-differences analysis for restricted versions of the sample. The 
first column replicates results for the whole sample. The second column limits the sample to retirees who, 
in the first wave, neither cover their spouses nor receive coverage from their spouse. The third column 
limits the sample to retirees whose spouses are either also retired in the first wave or not in the labor 
force. Table 8 reports results both for the entire sample and for individuals of different health status. None 
of the results reported in column 1 is sensitive to any of these restrictions. The same is true for the other 
results in Tables 2-7 (not shown). 
In addition, in results not reported here, I find that the estimated effect of Medicare is not 
sensitive to allowing the mean change in the dependent variable over time – as measured by  0 b  in the 
difference in difference specification – to vary by gender, race, education, marital status, health status, 
                                                 
22 Table 8 presents the results for self-reported health status. There is also no evidence of large declines among the 
least healthy as measured by number of reported chronic conditions (results not shown). 
23 Every individual in the main sample is retired, but the spouse is not necessarily retired.   20 
initial household income, and starting interview (1996 or 1998). Furthermore, the results are not sensitive 
to restricting the sample to individuals who have all retired by age 60, the youngest age in the sample.  
I examine whether the estimated effect of Medicare in equation (2) varies across other observable 
characteristics of the individual that have not yet been examined. There is no evidence of either 
substantive or statistically significant differences in the effects of Medicare by characteristics such as 
gender, race, martial status, size of firm the individual worked in prior to retirement, or year of starting 
interview. There is however, evidence of statistically significant 11 percentage point increase in 
prescription drug coverage among the lowest income group in the sample associated with Medicare 
coverage, and no significant changes in prescription drug coverage among higher income groups 
associated with Medicare coverage. This is consistent with a positive income effect from the Medicare 
program. Of course, an anticipated public program has no life-cycle income effects. However, if some 
individuals face binding liquidity constraints that prevent the purchase of comprehensive insurance 
coverage and the costs of the public program are not fully born by the current recipients, the public 
program may stimulate the market for residual private insurance by relaxing the binding liquidity 
constraint.
24 
To test the relative contribution of various covariates, I re-estimate equation (2) including a full 
set of interactions between  0 b  and covariates and between  MEDICARE D covariates.
25 When self-
reported health status is used as the measure of health, the finding of a statistically significant increase in 
prescription drug coverage among the least healthy and no evidence of changes among the healthier 
remains, and there are no significantly different effects of Medicare by other covariates, including 
income, When self-reported chronic conditions are used as the measure of health status, there is no 
evidence of differential effects of Medicare by any covariates, including health and income. 
                                                 
24 This assumes that the residual private insurance is not sold as a stand-alone product prior to the public program. 
This is a reasonable assumption in markets such as health insurance where the complementarities between modes of 
coverage make it inefficient, for example, to sell insurance for drug coverage to individuals who have none or only 
minimal hospital or doctor’s coverage. 
25 The covariates are: self-reported health status and indicator variables for whether the individual is male, whether 
he is white, his educational attainment category, his income category, marital status, firm size, whether he is a 
regular drug user, and the interview start date (1996 or 1998).   21 
5.5 Generalizability – the role of Medicare HMOs  
In interpreting the results, it is important to note that Medicare coverage is associated with a 
pronounced shift away from the employer as the primary source of private insurance coverage, 
predominantly toward coverage through Medicare HMOs, which are not available prior to age 65. Figure 
2 shows this graphically both for the treatment group and the control groups; compositional changes in 
the source of insurance coverage are not observed among the control groups.
26 This raises the possibility 
that the effect of Medicare might be substantially different if not for the existence of Medicare HMOs for 
the over-65 population.  
One way to examine this is to look for any evidence of an effect of Medicare within particular 
insurance markets. Table 9 investigates this issue by examining changes in prescription drug coverage 
among people who remain in the same insurance market.
 The top panel restricts the sample to retirees 
who have employer-provided coverage in both interviews; this excludes anyone who has private non-
group insurance or a Medicare HMO not supplied by an employer in either interview. This allows us to 
examine changes within the employer-provided market; it also removes the potential to confound the 
effect of Medicare at age 65 with the effect of the introduction of more stringent regulations in the non-
group market  (when only 10 standardized plans may be offered).  Since some retirees with employer-
provided health insurance may receive that coverage after age 65 through a Medicare HMO, the bottom 
panel further restricts the sample to those who have employer-provided coverage in both rounds and do 
not report having a Medicare HMO as well. The results indicate no evidence of an effect on Medicare 
coverage on private prescription drug coverage for individuals who stay within a given insurance market.  
  Of course, it is possible that changes within insurance markets are influenced by the outside 
option of the Medicare HMO, which affects the composition of the privately insured. To test this 
                                                 
26 Interestingly – and surprisingly –  this shift away from employer-provided retiree health insurance when Medicare 
coverage begins does not appear to be driven by reduced employer offering of retiree health insurance with 
Medicare coverage. For example, of full-time employees who are offered health insurance in small private 
establishments in 1996, 16 percent are offered retiree covered under age 65 and 15 percent are offered retiree 
coverage at ages 65 and over (U.S. Department of Labor, 1999a). For full-time employees who are offered health 
insurance in medium and large private establishments in 1997, these numbers are respectively 42 percent and 38 
percent (U.S. Department of Labor, 1999b).    22 
possibility, I examine changes in prescription drug coverage associated with Medicare in the period right 
before the growth of Medicare HMOs. Unfortunately, there are no panel data for such an analysis, but I 
am able to look at the effect of Medicare on private prescription drug coverage in a cross-section of the 
1989 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).
27 I limit the sample to retirees age 60-70 and further 
restrict the sample in the same way as described above for the HRS. I estimate the following regression: 
e b b b b b b + + + + + + =




2 1 0 65         (3) 
  The dependent variable is a binary measure of drug coverage. X is a matrix of dummies to control 
for covariates (gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, and health status). I control for age 
flexibly by allowing for a cubic in age.
28 The primary variable of interest – 
+ 65 Age   – is an indicator 
variable for whether the individual is on Medicare. 
The primary limitation to this cross-sectional analysis is that the results may be affected by the 
changing composition of the retirees with age, and particularly at age 65.
29 Nevertheless, the cross-
sectional estimates from a time before Medicare HMOs provide a partial test of whether the main results 
in the paper are primarily driven by the presence of Medicare HMOs. The results – some of which are 
reported in Table 10 – are similar to the effects of Medicare estimated in the HRS. This suggests that the 
estimated effects of Medicare in the HRS – both in the aggregate and by particular covariates of interest – 
are not sensitive to the presence of Medicare HMOs.
30  
7. Conclusion 
Compulsory public insurance programs that provide only partial coverage but allow private 
supplementary insurance are prevalent in many countries for both health-related and mortality-related 
risks. Theoretically, the effects of such programs on insurance coverage in the residual private market are 
                                                 
27 The 1989 NHIS is the only NHIS to ask about prescription drug coverage. There are no other large cross-sections 
from the 1980s that ask about prescription drug coverage. 
28 The results are not sensitive to fully dummying out all ages instead. 
29 When I analyze the HRS data in the cross-section, however, the results are similar to the panel results reported in 
the paper. This helps to alleviate concerns about substantial bias from changing composition of the sample. 
30 In results not reported here, I also find no evidence in the 1989 NHIS cross-section of an effect of Medicare on 
coverage for health insurance that does not cover prescription drugs.   23 
ambiguous. Perhaps most strikingly – given that the primary economic rationale for these public 
programs is to overcome adverse selection pressures in private insurance markets – these programs may 
in principle exacerbate or ameliorate the adverse selection pressures in the private insurance market for 
the residual risk.  Yet the effect of partial public insurance programs on supplementary insurance markets 
has received little, if any, empirical attention.  
This paper begins to address this void by examining the effects of Medicare coverage on the 
private insurance market for prescription drug coverage, a benefit not provided by the public program. I 
follow a panel of retirees in the HRS as they become covered by Medicare. By limiting the sample to 
retirees, I avoid confounding the effect of the public insurance program on the private market with 
possible changes in insurance coverage due to retirement. In order to control for any smooth effects of 
aging or the passage of time on the demand and supply of private insurance for prescription drugs, I 
compare changes in prescription drug coverage for retirees who become covered by Medicare to the 
effects between the interviews of the panel to changes for retirees slightly younger and older than those 
who would covered by Medicare over the two-year period between interviews.  
  The results indicate that Medicare is not associated with substantial changes in the private market 
for residual insurance coverage. In particular, I find no evidence for the hypothesis that Medicare is 
associated with increased adverse selection pressure in the residual private insurance market. Weaker tests 
also fail to find strong evidence for a role of consumer misinformation, fixed costs of insurance policies, 
or the moral hazard subsidy in affecting the interaction of Medicare coverage with the residual private 
insurance market. All of these results speak to the effect of Medicare on the extensive coverage margin. 
The data do not permit an analysis of the effect of Medicare on the amount of prescription drug coverage 
among the covered. However, any factors that would be likely to produce decreases in the demand or 
supply for the intensity of coverage would also be expected to affect the extensive margin; it is therefore 
unlikely that Medicare is associated with large, unmeasured changes in the amount of prescription drug 
coverage.   24 
The lack of any increase in adverse selection in the private market for prescription drug coverage 
associated with Medicare coverage is somewhat surprising given the relative predictability of an 
individual’s prescription drug expenditures compared to general medical expenditures.
31 It may be that 
increased adverse selection pressures in the residual private insurance market associated with Medicare 
coverage are offset by the reduced price of the insurance from the large moral hazard subsidy of the 
private insurance by the public program. This moral hazard subsidy may increase the willingness of low 
risk types to pool with high risk types, thus preventing the unraveling that might otherwise occur in the 
residual market. This suggests that the effects of other partial public insurance programs – such as defined 
benefit Social Security or public Disability Insurance programs –  on adverse selection in residual private 
markets may be greater to the extent that the moral hazard subsidy is smaller. I regard this as a natural 
extension to investigate in future work. 
More generally, in considering the applicability of the findings of the effect of Medicare to the 
impact of these other partial public insurance programs, three other factors warrant further investigation 
in future work. First, the effects of a partial public insurance program that begins coverage at age 65 may 
be different from one that provides coverage at any age. Second, the role of consumer misinformation and 
income effects in affecting residual private insurance markets depends on the group of affected 
individuals; the individuals studied here are all elderly, and the lowest-income and asset levels have been 
excluded to avoid confounding the effect of Medicare eligibility with changes in Medicaid eligibility at 
age 65. Finally, larger or smaller amounts of public coverage might be expected to have more or less of 
an impact on the private market.
                                                 
31 On the relative predictability of prescription drug expenditures compared to hospital or physician expenditures, 
see Ettner (1997) and Pauly and Zeng (2002). As Pauly and Zeng (2002) note, insurance for expenditures that are 
more predictable should be more subject to adverse selection both because individuals know more about their risk 
type and because the reduction in uncertainty about future expenditures reduces the consumer surplus from 
insurance.   25 
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 Table 1: Sample Statistics 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 
under Age 65 in both 
interviews 
Treatment Group: 
Retirees who turn 
65 between 
Interviews 
Older Control Group: 
Retirees Aged 65 and 
Older in Both 
Interviews 
Average Age, First Wave 
 
61.3  63.5  65.9 
Percent from 1996-1998 
Surveys 
0.51  0.53  0.32 
Percent Male  0.51  0.49 
 
0.56 
Percent White  0.91  0.90 
 
0.90 
Median Household Income 
in First Wave ($) 
37,573  33,512  32,568 
 
Educational Attainment in First Wave 
Less Than High School  0.20  0.22  0.24 
 












0.19  0.19 
 








Self-Reported Health in First Wave 
Fair or Poor  0.15  0.18 
 
0.21 
Good  0.31  0.31 
 
0.34 
Very Good or Excellent  0.54  0.50 
 
0.44 
N (in differences)  860  841  1,278 
All means are weighted. 
   29 
Table 2: Effect of Medicare on Private Prescription Drug Coverage 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 















Whole Sample, without covariates 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.785  0.696  0.694  0.720 
N (in differences)  854  825  1,245  2,924 
Whole sample, with covariates 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.785  0.695  0.693  0.719 
N (in differences)  850  820  1,241  2,911 
Notes: The first three columns present the results of estimating Equation (1). The fourth column presents the results 
from estimating Equation (2). The dependent variable is changes in private insurance coverage for prescription 
drugs. Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and for correlation within the error 
term across observations (in differences) for the same individual. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Table 3: Effect of Medicare on Private Prescription Drug Coverage, By Self Reported Health Status 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 















Health = Fair or Poor 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.705  0.542  0.700  0.658 
N (in differences)  141  160  267  568 
Health = Good 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.776  0.730  0.677  0.718 
N (in differences)  274  270  420  974 
Health = Very Good or Excellent 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.812  0.729  0.702  0.744 
N (in differences)  435  390  543  1368 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Health status is defined based on self-reported health status in first interview. All results 
include controls for covariates.   31 
Table 4: Effect of Medicare on Priv. Prescrip. Drug Coverage, By Number of Chronic Conditions 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 















3 or more chronic conditions 























Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.844  0.690  0.699  0.728 
N (in differences)  127  152  277  556 
2 chronic conditions         






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.808  0.732  0.647  0.713 
N  237  227  374  838 
1 chronic condition         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.762  0.676  0.729  0.722 
N  282  297  393  972 
No chronic conditions 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.749  0.685  0.688  0.710 
N  199  141  189  529 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. The number of chronic conditions is based on the number reported in the first interview. 
Individuals are asked about seven chronic conditions:  high blood pressure or hypertension, diabetes or high blood 
sugar, cancer,  chronic lung disease (such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema), heart problems (such as heart attack, 
coronary heart disease, angina or congestive heart failure),  stroke, or arthritis or rheumatism. All results control for 
covariates.  32 
Table 5: Effects of Medicare on Prescription Drug Coverage: Evidence of Misinformation 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 














Less than High School         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.588  0.566  0.608  0.592 
N (in differences)  179  188  310  677 
High School Graduate         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.815  0.693  0.681  0.724 
N (in differences)  323  321  417  1,061 
Some College or More         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.857  0.761  0.755  0.786 
N (in differences)  345  304  494  1,143 
REGULARLY USE PRESCRIPTION MEDICINE? 
Yes, regularly use prescription medicine 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.830  0.735  0.712  0.749 
N (in differences)  579  571  921  2,071 
No, do not regularly use prescription medicine 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.694  0.607  0.639  0.647 
N (in differences)  271  249  320  840 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. All categories are defined based on status in first interview. All results control for 
covariates.   33 
Table 6: Effect of Medicare on Private Insurance Coverage for Long-Term Care 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 






































Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.127  0.110  0.144  0.130 
N (in differences)  816  798  1,230  2,844 
Less than High School 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.087  0.044  0.091  0.077 
N (in differences)  173  186  310  669 
High School Graduate 























Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.130  0.103  0.102  0.111 
N (in differences)  311  309  408  1,028 
Some College or More 























Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.146  0.151  0.209  0.176 
N (in differences)  329  296  490  1,115 
Notes:  See notes to Table 2.  The dependent variable is changes in private long-term care insurance coverage. 
Educational attainment is based on reports in the first interview. All regressions control for covariates. 
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Table 7: Effect of Medicare on Health Insurance That Does Not Cover Prescription Drugs 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 















Whole Sample         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.109  0.154  0.180  0.152 
N (in differences)  850  820  1,241  2,911 
Health = Fair or Poor         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.112  0.154  0.161  0.148 
N  141  160  267  568 
Health = Good         





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.086  0.125  0.174  0.137 
N  274  270  430  974 
Health = Very Good or Excellent 





















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.120  0.172  0.193  0.164 
N  435  390  543  1,368 
See Notes to Table 3. The dependent variable is changes in coverage for health insurance that does not cover 
prescription drugs. All results control for covariates. 
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Table 8: SPECIFICATION CHECKS: Effect of Medicare on Private Prescription Drug Coverage 






Retirees who neither 
cover their spouse nor 




Retirees whose spouses 
are either also retired or 












































































































Notes: All cells report the coefficient on  MEDICARE D from estimation of equation (2) on the sample described. 
All regressions control for covariates. 
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Figure 2: Changes in Sources of Insurance Coverage for Indivdiuals who Become 








































Control Group A Treatment Group Control Group B  37 
 
Table 9: Changes in Private Drug Coverage for retirees who stay within markets 
  Younger Control 
Group: Retirees 














Retirees who have employer-provided insurance in both interviews 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.926  0.886  0.896  0.905 
N (in differences)  582  371  507  1,460 
Retirees who have employer-provided insurance in both interviews and do not also report a Medicare HMO 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.926  0.907  0.884   
N (in differences)  582  308  389  1,279 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 10: Effect of Medicare on Prescription Drug Coverage: 1989 National Health Interview Survey Data 





Self-Reported Health Status 
 
 
Limitations to Daily Activities 
 
Educational Attainment 
      Fair or 
Poor 
Good  Very 
Good or 
Excellent 


































































































N  5,784  5,699  1,574  1,863  2,262  1,065  1,274  3,415  2,193  2,224  1,282 
Notes: Results report estimation of equation (3) using the 1989 NHIS cross-section. All regressions control for covariates. See text for further details. 
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Appendix A: Measuring prescription drug coverage in the HRS 
   
Two issues arise in measuring prescription drug coverage in the HRS. First, the form of the survey 
questions suggests that the HRS will tend to systematically miss drug coverage from individuals who get 
this coverage through a Medicare HMO, especially if this Medicare HMO is not provided through an 
employer.  
 
To elicit information on drug coverage, the HRS inquires about private prescription drug coverage for 
those who are covered by employer-provided health insurance (question R27), those who are covered by 
Medicare and have non-group private health insurance (question R46e), and those who are not covered by 
Medicare and are covered by non-group private health insurance (question R55f). However, individuals in 
a Medicare HMO (i.e. respond affirmatively to question R11), are not asked if they have prescription drug 
coverage through the Medicare HMO. 
 
Data from the 1996 MCBS indicates that almost all (95%) of individuals in a Medicare HMO have drug 
coverage. Among those in the HRS who report having both a Medicare HMO and employer coverage, 
91% report drug coverage. However, the survey will miss people who have Medicare HMOs that are not 
provided through an employer; this is about 13% of the sample that is over age 65.  I adjust the HRS data 
to reflect this mis-measurement: I assign all individuals in a Medicare HMO drug coverage.  
 
Second, information about drug coverage is available not only based on the self-reported answers to 
questions about drug coverage described above, but also based on information about covered expenses. 
For those who report regularly taking prescription medications, the HRS asks whether these costs are 
covered at all, partly, or not all by health insurance (question E21).  
 
Since Medicare does not cover prescription drugs and individuals eligible for Medicaid are excluded from 
the sample, answers to question E21 present another way to measure whether individuals have private 
insurance that covers prescription drugs. In principle, utilization of both measures might be desirable. 
However, a measure based on reimbursements presents two difficulties. First, for individuals who do not 
report regularly using prescription drugs (about 30 percent of my sample), this measure yields no 
information on drug coverage. Since individuals who do and do not regularly use prescription drugs may 
differ in other ways, use of this measure could bias the measure of drug coverage. Second, this measure 
may underreport coverage for individuals who have prescription drug coverage but face a high deductible 
and therefore have not had any covered expenses in a given period. I therefore define drug coverage based 
on self-reported measures.  
 
The definition of drug coverage used in the paper is therefore that individuals are coded as having 
prescription drug coverage if they either report coverage for prescription drugs or are in a Medicare 
HMO. 
 
Sensitivity of results to definition of prescription drug coverage: 
 
To ascertain whether the main results in the paper were sensitive to the precise definition of prescription 
drug coverage, I examined the sensitivity of the findings to several alternative definitions of prescription 
drug coverage: 
•  Individuals are defined as having drug coverage if they report drug coverage; they are coded as a 
0.9 for drug coverage if they do not report drug coverage but are in a Medicare HMO 
•  Individuals are defined as having drug coverage if they report drug coverage or if they are in a 
Medicare HMO but do not also report having employer-provided health insurance coverage. 
•  Individuals are defined as having drug coverage if they either report having drug coverage, are in 
a Medicare HMO, or report some prescription drug expenses covered by insurance.   40 
 
Table A1 reports the results for estimates of the effect of Medicare for the entire sample and for the sub-
samples based on self-reported health status for these different definitions of drug coverage. The results 
are not sensitive to these alternative definitions. 
 
 
Table A1: Effect of Medicare on Drug Coverage Using Alternative Definitions of Drug Coverage 
  Definition used in 




Report drug  
coverage or .9 if 
have Medicare 
HMO 
Report drug coverage 
or, in a Medicare 
HMO and not also 
covered by employer 
Definition used in 



























Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.719  0.708  0.717  0.804 
N (in differences)  2,911  2,911  2,911  2,933 
Health = Fair or Poor 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.658  0.645  0.651  0.810 
N (in differences)  568  568  568  575 
Health = Good 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.718  0.707  0.716  0.811 
N (in differences)  974  974  974  985 
Health = Very Good or Excellent 






















Mean Dep Var (Wave 1)  0.744  0.732  0.743  0.797 
N  1,368  1,368  1,368  1,372 
Note: All estimates are based on Equation (2). Columns reflect different definitions of drug coverage. See Table 3 
for more information. 